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WILL THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS FUEL A RETURN TO RACIAL POLICIES
THAT DENY HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AND WEALTH?
By: Marcia Johnson 1
Introduction
Property ownership in America 
has traditionally been linked to power and 
wealth.2  French political historian Alexis 
de Tocqueville observed, “[T]he love of  
property is keener in the United States 
than it is anywhere else, and Americans 
therefore display less inclination toward 
doctrines that threaten, in any way, the 
way property is owned.”3 Property-related 
wealth comes in many forms, including 
the right to control tangible assets such 
as land and buildings.4   Homeownership 
today remains the single greatest source 
of  wealth and symbol of  well-being for 
most Americans.5  
Owning a home facilitates access 
to numerous privileges and opportunities 
borne from government law and policy, 
including tax credits, increased credit 
options, and increased worth and wealth. 
Homeownership also increases the value 
of  communities, neighborhoods, and the 
homes themselves.  It allows for better 
educational opportunities, social mobility, 
and community stability.6  Therefore, it is 
particularly signifi cant that government 
housing policies and practices have 
historically stifl ed the opportunity of  
African Americans to own and retain 
real property.  The consequences of  
these discriminatory policies continue to 
be dire.  
The ultimate aspiration of  
nearly every American family is to own 
a home.7  For many African American 
families this was still a near unattainable 
goal for more than one hundred years 
after the Emancipation Proclamation 
was signed.8  Government policies that 
excluded many African Americans from 
access to homeownership in the 1930s 
began changing in the late 1970s,  leading 
many to anticipate an increase in African 
American homeownership.9  However, 
in the years between the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) of  1977 and 
1995, the rate actually dropped 2.6%.10
Still, the CRA likely opened the door for 
post-1995 programs that provided easier 
access to credit, down payment assistance, 
and deferred mortgage payments. 
Indeed, more aggressive policies begun 
under Presidents Clinton’s administration 
provided greater opportunities,  resulting 
in a rate increase in African American 
homeownership from 42% in 1995 to 
47.4% by 2008.11  
Perhaps the greatest threat 
to the continued realization of  the 
American dream is the latest economic 
crisis rooted in the sub-prime mortgage 
collapse.12  Some blame the CRA of  
1977 for creating a market that they 
claim provided housing loans to non-
creditworthy borrowers – particularly 
African American families – in the low 
and moderate income range.13  However, 
this charge is without direct factual 
support as the post-CRA period saw a 
decline in homeownership for African 
Americans but a mild increase for White 
homeowners.14 Illegal and fraudulent 
practices in property appraisals and 
income reporting directed program 
benefi ts away from those the program 
was meant to aid.  
Nevertheless, of  the more 
than 3.6 million mortgage foreclosures 
projected to occur during the January 
2007 - December 2009 period, up to 
39% are sub-prime mortgages.15  Sub-
prime mortgages were far more popular 
with African American homebuyers than 
any other group, particularly from 1995-
to-2005.16  Although mortgage failures 
certainly pose an economic problem, 
it is not enough to have caused the 
collapse of  2008 or to support a return 
to housing policies that effectively deny 
homeownership opportunities to African 
American buyers.
Even recent government action 
to stunt such a return suggests that there 
were other sources of  the collapse, beside 
African American homeownership, or 
other sub-prime  mortgages.  For example, 
in 2008, the United States government 
approved a $750,000,000,000 bail-
out of  fi nancial institutions ostensibly 
due to the collapse in the sub-prime 
markets.17  Had the government instead 
paid every mortgagee the full amount of  
their initial mortgage loan, assuming a 
$200,000 loan average, the government 
could have purchased all bad mortgage 
debt for $720,000,000,000.18  100% of  
foreclosures from 2007 to 2008 would 
be paid.  If  only sub-prime mortgages 
were covered, the government could 
have paid all such foreclosures from 
2006 through 2008.19   
It is common for markets to rise 
into bubbles, for the bubbles to burst, and 
for industries profi ting from the bubbles 
to fail.  However, it is not common 
for the burst to lead to the collapse of  
the entire global market.  In the 1980s, 
savings and loans fell at a cost of  about 
$152.9 billion with taxpayers paying 82% 
or $126 billion. In the early 2000s, the 
technology industry bubble burst.20  Still, 
none of  these industry failures caused 
the world market to crater.  
This paper is written to examine 
the potential effect of  the market 
collapse on our nation’s homeownership 
policies.  Part I reviews America’s 
historical housing and homeownership 
policies.  Part II considers the expansion 
of  homeownership opportunities 
to historically non-participating 
communities, particularly the African 
American community.  Part III reviews 
the culprits of  the economic crash 
of  2008 and explains why sub-prime 
borrowers often get blamed.   Part 
IV examines solutions to maintain 
America’s pro-homeownership policy, 
and Part V concludes that America’s 
homeownership policy should continue 
to be vigorously pursued with a goal 
of  including African Americans who 
have long been excluded by government 
policies and sanctions from building 
wealth and thereby stabilizing their 
communities.
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Part I:  The History of  America’s 
Housing Policy
The American government has 
historically attended to the housing needs 
of  citizens who are unable to purchase 
homes.  Since the 1700s, the housing 
needs of  the poor have been addressed 
through formal systems including the 
provision of  “outdoor relief,” “boarding 
out,” almshouses and asylums. As people 
began moving away from small seaport 
towns21 and farms to cities in the 1900s,22 
increased housing demand23 caused a 
20-year building boom in urban areas.24 
This boom turned bust during the late 
1930s largely as a result of  the Great 
Depression when many Americans could 
afford neither to rent nor purchase a 
home.25  It was the Industrial Revolution 
that rejuvenated the development of  
American cities.26  
The late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries marked the 
beginning of  housing development 
within residential subdivisions.27  To 
assure both peaceful enjoyment of  one’s 
property and to maintain property value, 
developers and home buyers purportedly 
sought legal control mechanisms that 
would aid in protecting and preserving 
their property interests.28  Developers of  
these subdivisions relied on restrictive 
covenants, equitable servitudes, negative 
easements and zoning ordinances to 
ensure separation within residential, 
commercial, and industrial areas.29  The 
more sinister goal of  these devices was 
to divide people based on economic, 
social, and racial lines.30  Still, these new 
communities represented an expanded 
housing market driven by the growing 
need for homes. 
The federal government sought 
to address the expanding need for low-
cost homes through the Housing Division 
of  the Public Works Administration 
(PWA), which constructed public-owned 
housing units.31  Through the PWA, the 
government took control of  privately 
owned land for the public purpose of  
providing housing to those who could 
not otherwise afford it.  The seizure of  
land during this period was later found 
to be a wrongful exercise of  the federal 
government’s eminent domain power.32 
As a consequence, construction under 
this program ended, but the government’s 
ability to create housing opportunities 
flourished.33  
The United States Housing 
Act of  1937 (USHA)34 was the first 
national housing program and its 
goal was “to provide ‘a decent home 
in a suitable environment for every 
American Family…’”.35  In the 1940s, 
the federal government began providing 
low-interest financing through both the 
Federal Housing (FHA) and Veterans’ 
Administrations (VA) in keeping with this 
federal housing goal.  When American 
soldiers returned home from World War 
II, the nation’s policy of  homeownership 
continued to expand.36  Homeownership 
rates increased from about 45% to 65% 
after World War II due to government 
policies that increased access to credit and 
introduced innovative lending products, 
like the thirty-year fixed mortgage to the 
middle class.37  
USHA was controversial at 
the time and was challenged as an 
unconstitutional intrusion by the 
government in the private market.38  The 
United States Supreme Court found the 
Act within Congress’ power to provide 
for the public’s general welfare.39  This 
decision would have a compelling impact 
on housing opportunities in America, as 
USHA authorized the federal government 
to pay the principal and interest on tax-
exempt bonds, enabling the construction 
of  public housing developments for low-
income individuals.40  However, USHA 
was not an equal housing program, and 
assistance within the program operated 
on a racially-segregated basis.41  
Between 1937 and 1949, middle-
income Americans began moving outside 
the central cities and into suburban areas, 
resulting in diminished homeownership 
opportunities in urban areas.   Many of  
these urban areas became infested with 
slums and public housing. Congress 
reacted to this growing problem by 
passing the United States Housing Act 
of  1949,42 which is often touted as being 
the nation’s first official housing policy.43 
The policy was designed to remedy 
housing shortages, eliminate substandard 
housing, and provide a reasonable living 
environment for every American.44 
The policy had three major objectives: 
(1) to encourage private development 
in the housing market; (2) to provide 
governmental assistance to enable 
private enterprise; and (3) to fuel local 
governments in developing programs to 
help improve cities and housing.45  The 
Housing Act of  1949 authorized urban 
redevelopment and provided for the 
construction of  810,000 new housing 
units in six years.46  
This Act had a decidedly negative 
impact on African Americans because 
it  forced them to move from their 
homes as construction began, only to 
be placed on long waiting lists for public 
rental housing.47   In addition, although 
the federal government’s original plan 
was to revive urban communities, the 
government’s interest in the program, as 
well as the available funding, decreased 
rapidly.48  Consequently, many of  the 
completed units were substandard, 
meeting only basic housing necessities.49 
The fact that African Americans 
were not permitted to benefit from 
government-provided low-interest loans 
only exacerbated the plan’s negative 
impact.  For example, racially disparate 
application of  the FHA/VA loan 
programs, meant to encourage national 
homeownership, magnified and enforced 
economic and racial separation.50  As a 
result, the government created a two-
tiered system of  affordable housing: the 
upper tier consisted of  FHA and VA 
home acquisition loans while the lower 
tier was comprised of  public housing 
rental programs.51  
Under this two-tier system, 
minority and low-income families were 
placed in public housing rental programs, 
while Whites and other preferred classes 
were given FHA or VA home loans 
for homeownership.52  Even African 
Americans that met the qualifying criteria 
for loans were generally unsuccessful 
because the homes they could afford 
were located in neighborhoods that 
were predominately comprised of  
minorities and thus considered risky 
investments.53  As urbanization 
continued to rise, fear, ignorance, and 
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hatred propelled political groups toward 
considering race and class as factors 
when constructing planning devices 
and promulgating new housing laws.54 
Deliberate policies favoring segregation 
successfully divided classes and races.55 
Even after laws prohibited segregation, 
significant racial transition within White 
neighborhoods  often caused Whites to 
vacate these once segregated white areas, 
resulting in segregated African American 
neighborhoods.56    
In 1968, the United States 
Congress committed “to meet all of  the 
nation’s housing needs and eliminate all 
of  its substandard housing.”57  Congress 
acknowledged that not only had 
Americans failed to live up to the national 
commitment, but that the burden of  that 
failure was borne primarily by the poor.58  
This new housing policy made clear that 
it was designed to address the needs 
of  all Americans, including the poor. 
The Housing Act states:  “It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of  the United 
States to promote the general welfare of  
the nation . . . to . . . remedy the unsafe 
and unsanitary housing conditions and 
the acute shortage of  safe, decent and 
sanitary dwellings for families of  low-
income . . . .”59  This national policy laid 
the foundation for the government’s 
role in providing housing and housing 
opportunities for low-income people.60  
More than one hundred years 
after the Emancipation Proclamation 
freed slaves in America, Congress 
banned racial discrimination in housing 
practices.  Title VIII of  the Civil Rights 
Act of  1968, also known as the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA),61 the Equal Credit 
Opportunities Act (ECOA), the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 
and the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA), were all measures designed to 
ensure equal housing opportunities to 
all Americans. The FHA was a more 
comprehensive law addressing housing62 
and prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of  race, national origin, religion, 
sex, disability, and family status in real 
estate transactions.63  Similarly, the 1974 
ECOA prohibits discriminatory lending 
practices based on sex, marital status, race, 
religion, national origin, age, and receipt 
of  public assistance.64  Discrimination 
is further prohibited in consumer credit 
transactions under the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act.65  Later, the HMDA was enacted to 
require lending institutions to publicly 
disclose loan information to ensure racial 
equality in home mortgage lending.66
Despite  all these legislative 
efforts to ensure equal housing 
opportunities,  Congress found it 
necessary to take additional steps to 
encourage financial institutions to 
meet the credit needs of  traditionally 
neglected communities by enacting 
the Community Reinvestment Act of  
1977 (CRA).67  Banks historically took 
consumer deposits but failed to provide 
access to credit, particularly for minority 
and low-income communities.  The goal 
of  the CRA was to ensure that financial 
institutions would reinvest deposits back 
into these communities.  Under CRA, 
supervisory agencies were given the 
authority to deny banks the opportunity 
to merge, relocate, open a new office or 
close a particular branch if  they failed to 
comply with CRA demands.68
In 1989, the Financial Institution 
Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) was enacted to strengthen CRA 
enforcement by requiring publication of  
CRA ratings.  Banks were obligated to 
meet the credit needs of  the communities 
they served but were also obligated to 
disclose their performance record by 
making available the written evaluations 
prepared by regulatory agencies.69   This 
disclosure requirement gave community 
organizations the leverage to ensure 
that financial institutions were FIRREA 
compliant. 
In 1994, in an effort to 
improve both community development 
and the accessibility of  capital within 
deteriorating communities, Congress 
passed the Community Development 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(CDBFIA).70  This legislation established 
a “fund” that would aid in providing 
economic support to new and existing 
Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs).71  A CDFI is an 
institution whose primary purpose is to 
promote economic development, equity 
investments, and loans to persons within 
a specified target area.72  CDFIs are 
important to increasing homeownership 
because they are specialized financial 
institutions that work in communities 
or markets that traditional financial 
institutions have not adequately served.73 
CDFIs include community development 
banks, credit unions, loan funds, venture 
capital funds, and micro-entrepreneurial 
loan funds. CDFIs provide numerous 
services including mortgage financing 
for first time home buyers, financing for 
needed community facilities, commercial 
loans and investments to start or expand 
small businesses, loans to rehabilitate 
rental housing, and financial services 
needed by low income households and 
local businesses.  These institutions also 
provide services to ensure that credit 
is used effectively, such as technical 
assistance to small businesses and credit 
counseling to consumers.74
The Home Ownership for 
People Everywhere (“HOPE”) programs 
of  the 1980s and 1990s added another 
dimension to the federal housing policy, 
which previously focused on rental units. 
HOPE reoriented American housing 
policy towards homeownership.75 
Reaffirmed by Presidents Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush, this expanded 
policy embodied the belief  that enhanced 
homeownership serves the public 
interest, and justifies the use of  public 
dollars to achieve this goal.76
Part II:  Expanding Homeownership 
Opportunities to African 
Americans and Other Historically 
Disenfranchised Populations
Some theorists suggest that 
the American policy of  increasing 
homeownership to poorer populations 
and expanding mortgages was the single 
biggest contributor to the destruction 
of  the global market economy.77  Due, 
in part, to America’s renewed focus on 
homeownership, the share of  Americans 
who owned homes rose from 64% in 1994 
to 69% in 2005. These new homeowners 
were largely low- and moderate-income 
families and minorities.  Over that same 
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time period, the homeownership rate in 
the lowest tenth of  the income scale rose 
4 %, the second lowest rose 4 %, and the 
rates for African Americans and Latinos 
rose 7 and 8 %, respectively.  About 
12 million new homeowners emerged, 
roughly half  of  them African Americans, 
Latinos, and others of  mixed race. By 
2005, the United States occupied the top 
rung in world homeownership rates.78
Poverty, Income and Homeownership   
A large part of  the population 
remains beyond the reach of  traditional 
finance vehicles.  Almost 20 % of  all 
children in the U.S. live in poverty.79 
Poverty has a substantial impact on the 
quality of  education to which children 
have access.  Although numerous 
programs and policies exist to ensure 
that all children—regardless of  race 
or economic background—have equal 
educational opportunities, a substantial 
number of  children living in poverty 
endure inferior student services and 
substandard facilities.  These conditions 
help create a cycle of  poorly housed 
renters who contribute less overall to the 
good of  society than do better trained 
citizens.  Poor families often face barriers 
that restrict their ability to improve their 
socio-economic status.  For example, 
the ability to move to communities with 
better educational opportunities is not 
an option for many poor families.  A 
majority of  these families are renters 
and cannot afford rent or purchase 
prices in suburban or well-to-do urban 
neighborhoods.  Statistics support this 
observation.  According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau (Bureau), in 2002, about 
56% of  American families (owners 
and renter combined) could afford to 
purchase a modestly priced80 home in 
the area in which they lived.81  Among 
families that were current homeowners 
approximately 75% could afford to 
purchase a modestly priced home while 
only 10% of  those families who rented 
could afford to purchase such a home.82 
Since the late 1940s, the 
Bureau has surveyed and reported on 
the distribution of  income among U.S. 
citizens.83  According to the Bureau’s 
studies, family income inequality 
decreased by 7.4 % from 1947 to 1968,84 
But income inequality increased by 24.4 
% between 1968 and 1998.85  The income 
difference between households in the 95th 
percentile and those in the 20th percentile 
increased from approximately $96,000 in 
1994 to over $127,000 in 2000.86   
From 1999 to 2000, the median 
household income held at $42,100,87 the 
poverty rate in fell to the lowest it had 
been since 1979,88  and the number of  
poor persons fell.89 African American 
and Latino incomes rose as poverty90  
rates for these two groups fell,91 but 
their income still lagged far behind 
that of  Whites.92  Further, poverty 
rates for African American and female-
headed households reached their lowest 
recorded level in 2000.93  Nevertheless a 
1989 National Research Council study 
reported that the standard of  living for 
African Americans lagged far behind 
that of  Whites94 and showed that African 
American unemployment rates were 
more than two times that of  Whites.95  
Even in 2008, the African American 
unemployment rate was still more than 
two times that of  Whites.96  
All this demonstrates that 
while the standard of  living for African 
Americans has improved, a substantial 
number of  African American, Latino, 
and female-headed households continue 
to live in poverty at disturbing rates 
today.  While the income gap between 
African Americans and Whites decreased 
in 2006, by 2007 the gap returned and, a 
2007 Bureau report found that over 22% 
of  all African American families still 
have incomes below the official poverty 
line.97  
The Impact of  Poverty on Homeownership
Statistics show that a thriving 
home mortgage market needs to rely 
on untapped— increasingly poor and 
minority—borrowers.  In 1991, the 
Bureau reported that 57 % of  American 
families could not afford a median priced 
home in the area in which they lived.98 
African Americans and Latinos made up 
three-quarters of  these families.99  Four 
years later, the Bureau reported that 80 
% of  African American and Latino non-
homeowner families, almost double that 
of  White families,100 could not afford a 
median-priced home in the area in which 
they lived.101  By 2004, Bureau reports 
indicate homeownership rates for Whites 
was 76.2 % while African Americans and 
Latinos had homeownership rates of  
49.1 and 48.7 %, respectively.102  Overall 
homeownership rates in 2009 were at 
67.6%.103 
True comparisons of  racial and 
ethnic disparity in homeownership rates 
are more difficult because the Census 
Bureau changed the way it reported race 
in 2003.104  Using current race and ethnic 
standards, however, we can compare 
2006 to 2009 rates of  homeownership. 
The homeownership rates for Whites 
(non-Latinos) were about 76 % in 2006 
and about 75 % in 2009.  For African 
Americans, the rates were about 48 % 
in 2006 and about 46 % in 2009, and 
for Latinos (of  any race), the rates were 
about 49.5 % in 2006 and 48.7 % in 
2009. 105
In 2002, the Pew Institute 
reported that the median net worth was 
$88,651 for White households, $7,932 
for Latino households, and $5,988 for 
African American households,106 and 
that home equity was the key component 
of  household wealth, accounting 
for two-thirds of  mean net worth.107 
Public policy tends to support reaching 
out to these latter two ‘untapped’ 
communities of  potential homebuyers 
for a number of  reasons.  In addition to 
strengthening community development, 
homeownership is one of  the principal 
means by which low-income families 
acquire wealth.  Traditionally, home 
purchases were thought to be good 
investments because they allowed 
homeowners to build long term assets,108 
while also resulting in assets that 
homeowners could borrow against in 
the short term.  Policy considerations 
also include the  recognition that 
neighborhood environment affects 
the general welfare of  the nation and 
that homeownership has the potential 
to catalyze community growth, 
development, and stabilization.109 
Community stability in turn tends to 
FALL 2010 29
increase property values.110  
Moreover, racial and ethnic 
homeownership disparity has disturbing 
implications for a nation that is 
increasingly diverse, and this disparity 
played an important role in the decision 
to increase homeownership opportunities 
for these communities.111  The Bush 
White House initiative of  2000 included 
a goal to increase the number of  minority 
homeowners by at least 5.5 million by 
2010.112  The initiative also included 
an identification of  the barriers that 
many minorities faced when seeking to 
purchase a home as well as strategies to 
overcome the barriers.  One of  the most 
significant barriers to implementing this 
initiative proved to be financial.113   
Identifying the Financial Barriers114 
The White House identified 
numerous financial barriers to 
homeownership, including inability to 
make down payments, limited access 
to credit, poor credit histories, limited 
mortgage products, regulatory burdens, 
and lack of  access to financing in 
general.  The federal government 
then launched efforts to help targeted 
borrowers overcome these barriers.115 It 
was apparent that home loans were not 
unavailable per se but were unattainable 
for many Americans.  This lack of  access 
can be attributed to a number of  things, 
including racial barriers that remain 
rooted in society.  
 
Denying Access
“Redlining” is one method of  
denying people access to financing and 
refers to the practice of  outlining in red 
those areas on a map to which financial 
institutions are unwilling to extend 
their credit services.  These areas tend 
to include primarily minority and low-
income borrowers.  Although inequality 
and housing discrimination has existed for 
centuries in our nation,116 banks initiated 
the practice of  redlining in the 1960s117 
after race riots brought inequality to the 
forefront of  national concern.118  The 
federal government began to pay more 
attention to America’s legally-sanctioned 
discriminatory housing practices. The 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is 
often hailed as an act against redlining.119 
Although redlining is no longer a 
blatant practice, lenders continued to 
issue loans on a discriminatory basis by 
using marketing strategies that targeted 
borrowers based on race and adopting 
inequitable institutional policies.120  Many 
lenders who offered prime loans neither 
marketed nor solicited applications from 
minority or low-income applicants,121 
with the exception of  sub-prime 
alternatives offered in compliance with 
CRA requirements.  
One scholar has identified 
racial redlining as a barrier to African 
Americans’ ability to accumulate wealth 
because it restricts their participation 
in the marketplace as home sellers and 
buyers. Banks use racial redlining to deny 
access to credit so that a prospective buyer 
would not qualify for a home mortgage, 
in fact, “in a study conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board, [it was reported 
that] ‘banks reject African Americans 
‘for home loans 80% more often than 
equally qualified Whites.’  This rampant 
discrimination  disadvantages Blacks 
and contributes to the poverty cycle.”122 
Moreover, African-Americans who reside 
within identifiably African American 
neighborhoods were historically redlined 
out of  the mainstream mortgage 
market and forced to rely instead on 
sub prime loans and predatory lending 
practices. The effect of  securing loans 
through these more expensive markets 
also impacts the homebuyer’s ability 
to purchase homeowner’s insurance.123 
The FHA created two housing 
markets between the early 1930s and 
the 1960s by systematically excluding 
African Americans from lower priced, 
conventional mortgages.124 The FHA 
rated loan applicants from most 
desirable “A” to least desirable “D”. 
“A” neighborhoods were principally 
or exclusively white, native-born 
professionals and “D” neighborhoods 
were not.”125 In 1950, the FHA only 
granted 5% of  conventional loans to 
non-Whites thereby limiting low-cost 
mortgages to Whites. FHA-redlined 
neighborhoods encouraged racial 
segregation and their monopoly on 
the mortgage market meant that any 
exclusion from the program constituted 
exclusion from the housing market.126  
The CRA is to some extent responsible 
for the decreased disparity between 
loans awarded to Whites and those 
awarded to minorities.127  Although there 
has been some decrease, minorities are 
increasingly and disproportionately 
serviced by sub-prime lenders.128 Even 
affluent African Americans are twice 
as likely to refinance in the sub-prime 
market as low-income Whites.129  With the 
skyrocketing rate of  immigration, home 
ownership in immigrant communities 
has risen on the priority list of  many 
lending and governmental institutions. 
As immigrants buy homes at an ever- 
increasing rate, unscrupulous lenders 
will frequently target them, because they 
often lack a sophisticated understanding 
of  the American mortgage system.  This 
is especially true for non-fluent English 
speakers who fall prey to predatory 
lenders who impose exploitative loan 
terms and conditions.130
 Sub-prime lenders tend to target 
minorities, low- to moderate-income 
borrowers, and borrowers who live in 
certain communities that are considered 
high risk.  These communities are also 
most likely to be affected by the hardships 
associated with predatory lending, such 
as high interest rates, unreasonable fee 
scales,131 loss of  home equity, and even 
social and psychological problems.132 
In some cases, these lenders take 
advantage of  borrowers with excellent 
credit histories who may not realize 
their eligibility to obtain a prime market 
loan133 and direct them instead to sub-
prime loans.134  
According to current Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, 
African Americans and Latinos are still 
consistently denied credit when applying 
for home loans and when refinancing 
at rates disproportional to those of  
Whites.135  Discriminatory lending 
practices in the conventional lending 
market continue to expand the sub-
prime mortgage market.  
The road to a national policy 
of  homeownership has been a long one 
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from that time in our nation’s history 
when some were denied the opportunity 
because of  their race.  During the last 
decade, attempts were made to open 
the door of  the American dream of  
homeownership to all people.  One 
potential by-product of  the 2008 economic 
crash is the reversal of  homeownership 
encouraging policies, but such a reversal 
would ignore the underlying problems of  
the crash by placing blame on the wrong 
culprit.   Placing the sole blame upon the 
homeownership policy or minority home 
buyers would be unfair and inaccurate.
Part III:  Homeownership and the 
Economic Crash of  2008:  Is the 
sub-prime borrower to blame?
The sub-prime mortgage
The sub-prime mortgage is 
traditionally described as a type of  loan 
granted to individuals who have poor 
credit score histories (often below 600) 
that disqualify them from conventional 
mortgages.136  Because sub-prime 
borrowers present a high risk for lenders, 
sub-prime mortgages charge interest 
rates above the prime lending rate.137 
Borrowers with credit scores above 
650 are generally charged a significantly 
lower rate of  interest on their loans 
than are charged on sub-prime loans.138 
     Lower interest rates and high capital 
liquidity encouraged lenders to grant 
sub-prime loans from 2004 to 2006. 
More importantly, lenders sought 
additional profits through these higher 
risk loans, charging interest rates above 
prime to balance against heightened 
default risks.   More than the government 
homeownership policy, it was the 
perceived potential for large profits that 
motivated lenders to increasingly give 
out sub-prime mortgage loans. 
Sub-prime mortgage lending can 
be described as predatory.139  Borrowers 
who are either financially unsophisticated 
or financially desperate for credit may 
agree to unjustified high interest rates, 
payments that they cannot afford, 
frequent refinancing arrangements, 
high and unfair prepayment penalties, 
excessively high points or origination 
fees, and high broker fees.  Predatory 
lending also involves abusive lending 
practices in which the terms of  the 
loan are inadequately correlated to the 
riskiness of  the loan.140  In essence, 
buyers least able to afford their homes 
were charged more than those who 
are better able to – the poor paid 
more for their houses than the rich. 
Moreover, statistics show that minority 
buyers who qualified for conventional 
mortgages with better terms were often 
steered toward sub-prime mortgages.141 
Research has shown that approximately 
half  of  sub-prime borrowers qualify 
for conventional loans but are led to 
accept sub-prime loans instead.  These 
borrowers are unaware that they qualify 
for lower interest rates because the 
lenders withhold the information in 
order to swindle minority borrowers into 
accepting higher interest rates, insurance 
payments, and other fees associated with 
the process.142  These buyers were also 
more likely to face “creative” financing 
options that included adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs), interest only loans, 
and other products that induced the 
buyer into the transaction only to get 
a substantial increase in mortgage 
payments or balloon payments within a 
period of  a few years.143  These so-called 
“teaser mortgage products” provided 
short term success and often produced 
long term failure.
The interest rates tied to 
loans traditionally given to minorities 
also demonstrate the existence of  
discrimination.  African Americans 
typically pay interest rates one-third of  
a percent  higher  than Whites.  This 
amounts to approximately $11,756 over 
the life of  a thirty-year $145,000 loan, 
and is evidence of  predatory lending. 
If  poorer African American families 
are paying a higher monthly mortgage 
than wealthier White families for 
equal or poorer facilities, then African 
Americans are at a disadvantage and 
will have less disposable income than 
their White counterparts.  Additionally, 
African Americans in low-income 
communities typically live in older, 
more dilapidated housing.  This 
discrimination further serves to foster 
an African American underclass.144 
A deeper look into foreclosures
In 2007, home foreclosures 
reached 2.2 million, a 75 % increase 
from the previous year.145   Many who 
lost or were at risk of  losing their homes 
to foreclosures were unexpected victims. 
For example, foreclosures in military 
towns and their surrounding towns and 
cities are outpacing the national average 
four times over.146  Working Americans 
with secure employment lost their 
homes to foreclosures because they 
were unable to make their mortgage 
payments, suggesting that much of  these 
defaults were due to the structure of  the 
mortgage—many involved adjustable 
rates frontloaded with teaser rates that 
escalated to amounts that working 
families could not manage. 
Significantly, as bad as 
the mortgage  crisis has been, an 
estimated 94% to 99% of  mortgages 
are performing.147 Moreover, it is 
estimated that more than 75% of  sub-
prime mortgages will perform.148  By 
2012, however, 13% of  all American 
residential loans are projected to end 
in foreclosure.149  This would mean 
that 87% of  mortgage loans would be 
performing, but it is the profile of  the 
13% that compels further review.
Sub-prime lending accounts 
for the greatest percentage of  home 
mortgage foreclosures.150  While sub-
prime mortgages represent only 14 % 
of  the mortgage loans, they represent 
almost 50 % of  the foreclosures.  The 
general consensus is that low-income 
and minority homeowners have suffered 
disproportionately because they have 
participated in the sub-prime lending 
market at greater rates than White and 
Asian borrowers.  In 2006, African 
American and Latino communities 
accounted for more than 53 and 46 % of  
the sub-prime home loans, respectively.151 
By 2007, African Americans carried 34% 
of  high priced mortgages compared 
with 10.6% for Whites.152   According to 
an analysis of  loans reported under the 
federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
African Americans were 2.3 times more 
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likely to take out sub-prime mortgages 
and Latinos twice as likely.153   In 2007, 
59 % of  all sub-prime loans were in 
tracts that were less than 30 % minority 
and only 17% were in tracts that were 
more than 70 % minority.154  
While creditworthiness may be 
one reason for the high number of  sub-
prime loans in minority communities, 
a greater reason appears to be race.155 
Despite the CRA’s intent to address 
redlining by requiring banks to make 
loans in lower income neighborhoods, 
it did not require banks to actually be 
located in those communities.  As a 
result, banks typically maintain offices 
and branches in White communities 
while lending institutions offering sub-
prime loans are strongly visibility in 
minority communities.156  This helps to 
explain why minority borrowers eligible 
for lower cost loans obtain higher cost 
products instead.  
A Wall Street Journal study found 
that as many as 61 % of  all sub-prime 
borrowers in 2006 could have qualified 
for more conventional products based 
on their credit scores.157  Various firms 
record the states and cities hardest hit 
by foreclosures,158 and most of  these 
states and cities are overwhelmingly 
White.159  In other words, while a higher 
percentage of  people of  color than of  
Whites assume sub-prime mortgages, 
most sub-prime loans overall do not 
go to people of  color.160   This suggests 
that even though sub-prime mortgages 
made to minority buyers has affected the 
overall foreclosure numbers, something 
other than sub-prime lending may be 
responsible for the national downturn.
How sub-prime mortgages fueled the economic 
crisis of  2008
Since World War II, the 
nation’s housing policy has sought to 
expand housing opportunities.  More 
recently, housing policies also aimed 
to make mortgages available to poorer 
Americans.161  In theory, this policy 
recognizes that national wealth is 
dependent on the wealth of  each of  the 
nation’s citizens, and it also sought to 
address the history of  racial and ethnic 
discrimination that affected property 
lending and insurance practices, such 
as redlining.162  The policy was steeped 
in good intention, but many argue that 
it forced lenders to abandon sound 
business practice in order to lend to the 
poor and to minorities, resulting in the 
housing bubble burst that brought the 
global economy to its knees.163
As discussed earlier, sub-prime 
mortgages are characterized as risky, 
which means lenders are more likely to 
see defaults on sub-prime loans than on 
conventional or prime loans.  However, 
in relation to the economic crisis of  2008, 
the sub-prime mortgage was merely 
an essential element in the ultimate 
collapse.  In the early 1990s, a collapse 
of  the sub-prime market may have been 
inconsequential as it accounted for less 
than 1% of  all mortgage lending.164  By 
2005, sub-prime lending grew to 20% of  
all mortgage lending.165  
Demand for sub-prime loans 
increased after the dot-com bubble burst 
in 2001. To boost confidence in the 
market, the federal government lowered 
interest rates, encouraging people to 
borrow.  For most Americans, homes 
represent their largest investment, so 
the credit market sought to attract more 
home loans.  Capital flowed into the 
hands of  borrowers who in turn bought 
more homes. Property values increased, 
but some of  these values were based on 
aggressively unreliable appraisals that 
artificially inflated housing valuation and 
increased loan amounts.  People whose 
homes were already mortgaged were 
enticed to secure second and even third 
liens against their home equity, relying 
on these escalating home valuations.  In 
many instances, borrowers ultimately 
owed more than their houses were 
worth.   
Much of  this activity was fueled 
by an unquenchable thirst for wealth. 
Mortgage brokers and sub-prime lenders 
sought out people who would borrow at 
exorbitant rates and fees.   Theoretically, 
these loans would not put brokers and 
lenders in grave jeopardy because risk 
supposedly goes down as it is spread 
out.  Instead of  the bank holding all of  
the risk, the government would share a 
significant portion of  that risk through 
FNMA, FHA, and others.  At first, this 
risk-sharing plan appeared to work well, 
and securitization emerged as a way to 
increase profit while addressing growing 
market demands.
Securitization166  
Responding to the increasing 
interest of  the non-depository mortgage 
lenders to find a source of  liquidity 
for conventional loans, government 
sponsored entities (GSE) began issuing 
mortgage-backed securities (MSB) 
that passed interest to investors.167 
The investors, in turn, found these 
securities to be easily transferable on the 
market because the GSEs guaranteed 
the principal and interest income of  
the securities even if  the mortgagors 
defaulted.168  Private institutions soon 
recognized the profitability of  these 
investments and began pooling home 
mortgages but specifically excluded 
home equity loans and sub-prime 
mortgages.169   This created a market 
niche for private pooling that basically 
began in 1977 with Bank of  America and 
Salomon Brothers.170  Unfortunately, this 
securitized mortgage vehicle was based 
on a highly unreliable risk assessment 
model.171
 Beginning in the 1990s, 
mortgage financing found creative ways 
to reach otherwise unqualified borrowers. 
Numerous mortgage products aimed 
at attracting ‘untapped’ borrowers 
included balloon mortgages, adjustable 
rate mortgages, interest only loans, and 
others.  Initially, these loan products were 
made to prime borrowers who carried a 
low risk of  default.  However, extending 
securitization to higher risk sub-prime 
borrowers became increasingly attractive 
for investment banks seeking higher fees 
and greater profits.172 Wall Street analysts 
produced computer models supposedly 
demonstrating that risks associated with 
pooling sub-prime debt were comparable 
to risks of  prime backed securities.  
Initially, the models seemed 
accurate. Between 2001 and 2005, sub-
prime defaults dropped from 10 % to 
5 %.  Many borrowers, however, were 
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warding off  default by getting new 
housing equity loans to pay off  the 
original debt.  This created the illusion 
that the loans were performing and 
were therefore low risk.  In actuality, the 
borrower’s situation typically worsened, 
as new debt was generally higher than 
the original high-cost debt.  Instead 
of  avoiding default, the borrower was 
simply deferring an increased liability. 
Moreover, because securitized sub-
prime mortgages were a relatively new 
phenomenon, there was little data with 
which to test the computer models.  In 
other words, the combination of  easy 
capital and an abundance of  available 
money far exceeded the underlying goal 
of  increasing American homeownership. 
The new goal was to target as many new 
buyers as possible to fuel the unregulated 
greed that was consuming Wall and 
Main Streets. Based, in large part on 
the optimistic models, ninety percent 
of  securitized sub-prime loans received 
the highest rating available: AAA. 
Reality ultimately struck and about 50 
% of  AAA-rated sub-prime securities 
defaulted.  During this same period of  
mirage, collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO) were revived as a way to diversify 
the mortgage pool by mixing sub-prime 
mortgages with asset-backed securities 
and credit derivatives.  When the smoke 
cleared, almost 100% of  all AAA CDOs 
had at least partially defaulted.173  
CDOs and ABSs are secured by 
underlying real estate.  When the note 
defaults, the holder of  the CDO or ABS 
should be able to sell the underlying 
property to recover any financial loss. 
However, in this new market, the property 
is likely to be worth far less than the debt 
it secures.  Moreover, the housing market 
has been stalled by the collapse of  the 
credit market.  The credit market stall 
should have been temporary and should 
have been reversed with the infusion 
of  government TARP funds, but it was 
neither temporary nor reversed, thus 
exacerbating the decline of  the housing 
market.  Inaccessibility to credit has less 
to do with housing policy or sub-prime 
mortgages and more to do with another 
Wall Street invention designed to make 
more money for investors.  Coupled 
with failing sub-prime market securities, 
the failure and potential failure of  credit 
default swaps would send the global 
markets reeling.
Credit Default Swaps and Their Role in the 
Credit Collapse
American billionaire Warren 
Buffett described speculatively-bought 
derivatives as financial weapons of  mass 
destruction.174  A credit default swap 
(CDS) is a credit derivative where one 
party makes periodic payments to the 
other and gets promise of  a payoff  if  a 
third party defaults.175  The first party gets 
credit protection and is called a buyer. 
The second party gives credit protection 
and is called the seller.  The third party is 
known as the reference entity.  The CDS 
is an insurance policy written in favor of  
the insured who is not the owner of  the 
product that is actually being insured. 
An investor, also known as the buyer, 
can gamble that a company will likely 
default and purchase an insurance policy 
that pays the investor-buyer money if  
the reference entity defaults.176  
The underlying theory for the 
CDS probably comes from the 1958 
Modigliani-Miller theorem,177 which 
finds that the value of  a firm can be 
independent of  the firm’s ration of  
debt to equity,178 and that swaps and 
derivatives ensure the safety of  the 
financial system.179  However, it is a 
mathematical computerized financial 
model created by David Li that is at 
the core of  the financial collapse of  
2008.180  Li’s model, which catapulted 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem into the 
huge derivatives market, was designed 
to calculate default correlations by 
predicting risk.181  Notwithstanding Li’s 
own warnings about important flaws in 
his model, investment bankers, beginning 
with those at Banker’s Trust and J P 
Morgan Chase, relied on the model.182
An estimated $58 trillion in 
outstanding CDS liability exists.  If  this 
CDS market collapses, it will produce 
consequences far greater than sub-prime 
mortgage defaults.183  There will not 
be enough money to pay all the claims, 
which is why the federal government 
is attempting to shore up banks and 
insurance companies with cash infusion 
and why the cash is not being used to 
extend credit.  The cash infusions are 
being hoarded to pay off  the CDS 
claims of  savvy billionaire investors, not 
of  sub-prime borrowers.  These buyers 
who have cashed out (and will cash out 
in the future) by insuring products they 
didn’t even own have made out like 
bandits.  Yet, because the CDS market 
is completely unregulated,184 it will be far 
more difficult to identify these winners 
than it was to identify the hedge fund 
winners.
Selling Short (Short sales)
Out of  the CDS market grew 
“the short sale,” another tool investors 
used to make unimaginable sums of  
money.185  Unlike the traditional “‘long 
sale’” where the investor bets that the 
company in which she is investing will 
prosper, the short seller bets that the 
company will fail.186  The short sale has 
existed since the seventeenth century and 
has remained controversial throughout 
its lifetime.  Short trading is legal,187 but 
the government sought to regulate the 
practice, which one congressman called 
“the greatest evil that has been permitted 
or sanctioned by the Government,” after 
the stock market crashed in 1929.188
Until recently, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulated short selling.189  The regultion 
prohibited the short sale of  an exchange-
traded security in a falling market.  The 
prohibition applied to every transaction 
effected on a national securities exchange 
and to transactions in certain exchange-
traded securities affected in the over-the-
counter market.190  On the other side of  
the debate, de-regulators suggested that 
the short seller is a valuable town crier 
in the economic marketplace.  Arguing 
that the short seller does not cause the 
company to fail, but merely identifies 
which companies are struggling due to 
poor management and overvaluation, 
the SEC deregulated the industry on July 
2, 2007.  
At issue in this article is how 
significant a role short sales played in the 
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current economic crisis. Some investors 
viewed mortgage trading as a bubble that 
would eventually burst and shorted the 
companies—principally banks, insurance 
companies, and mortgage companies—
that were investing in this debt.  As 
debtors began to default and credit 
schemes began to unravel, short sellers 
profited—some in huge amounts.  If  the 
short sale represents a peculiar industry 
of  buying and selling borrowed stock, the 
credit default swap, which gives investors 
unregulated power to insure companies 
that they do not own, makes the short 
sale seem less menacing.
Credit
A weak American credit market 
substantially affects the overall health of  
international economies.  The American 
consumer uses credit to pay for homes 
and education in the U.S., but also for 
goods imported from abroad.  American 
businesses rely on credit to conduct, 
maintain, and expand operations both 
domestically and abroad.  When lenders 
fail or refuse to lend, people around the 
globe suffer.  
One of  the reasons banks are 
unwilling to lend is because they fear 
that toxic debt, otherwise described as 
potential CDSs and short sale liability, 
is yet to be fully identified or assessed. 
Banks are hoarding money in reserve to 
defray potential losses in debt.  Generally, 
a bank’s equity-to-debt ratio is about one 
dollar in equity to support every twenty 
dollars in debt.  The SEC permitted 
investment banks to have a 1:30 equity-
to-debt ratio.191  To assess the accuracy 
of  the ratio and therefore the risk, 
banks rely on rating agencies.  When 
the rating agencies incorrectly rate high 
risk ABSs, CDOs, and sub-prime MBSs 
as AAA, thereby severely discounting 
the risk, lenders are left seriously 
undercapitalized.192  The government’s 
infusion of  capital into these banks, 
while bolstering the reserves needed 
to ward off  potential liability, has not 
adequately contributed to re-opening the 
credit markets.193
In other words, if  the banks 
did not have to provide reserve funds 
for so-called toxic debt, they would be 
able to make more loans to companies, 
consumers, and home buyers.  The 
current economic catastrophe is rooted 
in the failure of  these myriad investment 
vehicles’ inability to expand the sale of  
single family homes to Americans.  That 
said, a healthy economy cannot survive 
purely on credit and consumerism.  Nor 
can opening the credit markets alone 
restore the economy.  Credit should be 
governed by sensible business principles 
that include re-opening mortgage 
markets even to higher risk borrowers.
Part IV:  Looking for Solutions
You got Wall Street 
firms, Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers.  
You got insurance 
companies like AIG.  
Merrill lost a ton of  
money on this… 
Everybody’s lost a ton 
of  money.  They’re 
supposed to be the 
smartest investors in 
the world.  And they 
did it to themselves.  
They blew themselves 
up.194 
Numerous factors contributed to 
the economic collapse of  2008.  The sub-
prime mortgage market was one factor 
but was not the only culprit.  Indeed, 
losses related to high risk mortgages are 
dwarfed by those related to derivatives 
and securitization.  According to Frank 
Partnoy, “we wouldn’t be in any trouble 
right now if  we had just had underlying 
investments in mortgages.  We wouldn’t 
be in any trouble right now.”195  In fact, 
even though foreclosure rates on sub-
prime mortgages are much higher that 
foreclosure rates on prime mortgages, 
some 80 % of  sub-prime loans are 
still performing, and sub-prime loans 
continue to enable borrowers to own 
homes, increase wealth, and convert their 
sub-prime loans to conventional ones.196
If  Partnoy is correct (and the 
numbers reflect that he is),197 it would 
be foolhardy to abandon the goal of  
increasing homeownership opportunities 
in America.  Instead, government policy 
should continue to recognize the value 
of  homeownership to individual and 
national wealth.  This would require 
the nation to continue to address the 
barriers to homeownership, particularly 
the financial barriers, in a comprehensive 
and rational way.  That said, not every 
American needs or is able to own a home. 
Financial prudence and good sense 
must work in concert with any program 
designed to expand homeownership 
opportunities.
Addressing the absence of  Credit
 
The government has tried to 
stimulate the financial markets and 
reinvigorate lending, but the credit 
market remains closed.  Instead, banks 
are putting money received from the 
government into reserves in anticipation 
of  CDS claims.  While estimates of  
potential CDS claims continue to rise, 
it is likely they are in the hundreds of  
billions of  dollars.  Chase Bank alone is 
involved in over 4 trillion dollars in CDS 
investments.198  At these rates, there will 
never be enough money to stimulate the 
financial markets back into lending again. 
This leaves the government as the major 
source of  loans, and there are a number 
of  government-backed programs in 
place to provide the funding necessary 
to support homeownership.  
In order to stop the market’s 
financial bleeding, regulators should put 
a halt to CDSs.  There should also be a 
time-specific requirement that all holders 
of  CDS instruments must report their 
holdings.  In this way, potential liability 
can be calculated and the proper amount 
of  reserves needed to compensate can 
be set aside.   Since CDSs terminate after 
time, the markets will also know how long 
the potential loss exists.  In the event the 
CDS continues as an investment vehicle, 
the law prohibiting regulation should be 
overturned so that the CDS market will 
be at least as transparent as the overall 
investment market.199
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Specific Financial Remedies: No need to re-
invent the wheel
Various existing government 
programs provide financial fixes through 
subsidies that fill the gap between funds 
needed to close sales and funds potential 
buyers have to purchase homes.200 
These programs provide down payment 
assistance, tax credits,201 expanded funds 
to the secondary mortgage market202 and 
various financial incentives to private 
homebuilding and financing entities.203 
There is significant value in these 
programs, but additional government 
money to support these programs 
where few alternatives exist could serve 
as a much needed ‘TARP’ for ordinary 
citizens.
The Land Trust
Land trusts are used to protect 
natural resources.204  While the land trust 
movement has grown tremendously 
since its inception more than one 
hundred years ago, it remains principally 
a conservation and environmental 
protection tool.205  The land trust concept 
can easily be expanded to include the goal 
of  protecting affordable housing stock 
and homeownership opportunities.206
Land trust corporations207 
may acquire land in fee simple for 
the charitable or public purpose of  
providing affordable homeownership 
opportunities.208  Technically, the trust 
would acquire the land and retain 
ownership of  it,209 and the homeowner 
would purchase the house itself  but 
not the underlying land.  This option 
could be particularly helpful in gentrified 
communities where land values, property 
taxes, and insurance costs are so high 
that homeownership can become 
unaffordable.210  
Under this option, homeowners 
would pay the taxes assessed solely on 
the house value, while property taxes 
assessed on the land value would be 
exempt or paid by the trust.211 Similarly, 
homeowner insurance would be based 
on the cost of  replacing the house 
and not on the price of  the land.  The 
homeowner could acquire the land 
over time at a low purchase price (pre-
escalated or modified escalation value) 
and even share profits from the sale of  the 
property with the trust.212  The financial 
gain to the homeowner at the sale of  
the property would be based on  the 
number of  years the property would be 
held as affordable.   A homeowner could 
sell the property to another qualified 
buyer without penalty allowing the  land 
use restrictions to transfer to the new 
owner. On the other hand, a homeowner 
who sold the property to a fair market 
purchaser could share some profit from 
the sale with the trust. The amount of  
profit realized would be related to the 
number of  years the homeowner owned 
the property under the affordability 
restriction.213 Moreover, an incentive to 
participate in such a transaction could 
be to permit the initial buyer to share in 
some of  the appreciated land value as 
well as the value of  the house itself.  
The sales agreement between 
the trust and the homeowner can provide 
for an affordable housing payment 
to the trust.  Rather than securing a 
sub-prime mortgage, the qualified 
buyer would contract for a loan that 
would be affordable.  Not only might 
this affordable housing program help 
improve the buyer’s financial condition, 
but the homeowner will pay a return to 
the public upon sale.
Tax Abatement and Exemption Programs  
Property taxes are calculated 
based on the assessed value of  the 
property and are commonly described 
as ad valorem taxes.  Affordable housing 
developments are often constructed 
on land with low valuation.  Low value 
appraisals are essential for ensuring low or 
affordable sales prices.  Pre-development 
residents generally pay lower taxes 
than do residents who move in post-
development, when property values for 
the area have risen.  Affordable housing 
developments tend to address blighted 
conditions, upgrade the community, 
and generally increase the value of  new 
residences as well as existing ones.214  As 
more housing is developed and a more 
stable community is established, values 
continue to increase.  The double-edged 
sword of  development is that it could tax 
existing residents as well as newcomers 
out of  their homes.215  This is especially 
true of  development near downtown 
locations where land values may increase 
dramatically and quickly.216  
Effectively addressing the 
property tax problem is challenging. 
One option is for the owner to sell at 
higher value, enjoying the windfall of  
equity build up in the land since it was 
purchased.  This is not necessarily averse 
to the public interest of  building wealth in 
historically impoverished communities.217 
However, the drawback to electing the 
windfall option is the potential reduction 
in economic and racial diversity in the 
community and the displacement and 
replacement of  longtime community 
residents.  This is commonly referred 
to as gentrification—the replacement 
of  lower income residents with higher 
income residents through increased 
property taxes and sale prices.
A second option tempers the 
first option’s market-driven approach. 
A municipality or developer can impose 
restrictive affordability covenants that 
run with land purchased under the 
affordable housing program.  Presuming 
that the program is designed to increase 
affordable housing stock and expand 
homeownership opportunities to 
historical renters, the covenant would 
be designed to retain affordability for an 
express term and could be written in a 
way to permit the homeowner to recover 
a share of  the equity that would be less 
than the windfall of  option one.  Under 
this second option, the homeowner may 
sell the property at a price higher than 
was paid based on the higher valuation 
but may keep only a percentage of  the 
profit based on the length of  time he 
or she owned the property.  This meets 
two goals: increasing homeowner wealth 
and retaining an affordable housing fund 
even if  the specific housing stock is no 
longer affordable.
A third option is tax abatement. 
Commonly used by municipalities to 
attract business enterprises, it could 
also be used to encourage economically 
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diverse communities and reduce the 
displacement of  residents who have 
no viable relocation alternatives.  Tax 
abatement and tax exemption programs 
are legislatively-established measures for 
shifting the burden of  property taxes away 
from a target taxpayer population.218  The 
general purpose of  the tax exemption 
is to encourage publicly desired 
objectives.219  A cost-benefit analysis 
should be done to determine which 
groups will be impacted positively, which 
groups will be affected negatively, and 
whether a complete or partial exemption 
is or should be available.220  Tax 
abatements are also financing tools that 
may be used to revitalize economically-
depressed areas.221  Abatements 
commonly forgive all or a portion of  
property taxes for a specified period of  
time.  Tax abatements are often used to 
attract business communities with the 
goal of  creating jobs and encouraging 
community vitality.222  It is unclear how 
beneficial such business abatements have 
actually been in the past, but as part of  a 
comprehensive redevelopment program, 
they could increase the level and speed 
of  a community’s revitalization.223
Tax Credits
Tax credit programs provide 
incentives for tax-burdened entities 
to participate in low-income housing 
programs.  The Tax Reform Act of  1986 
established the low income housing tax 
credit and was designed to increase the 
number of  affordable housing rental 
units in the United States.224  It is often 
criticized,225 but there is also a growing 
movement to expand the program to 
include low-income homeownership 
tax credits.226  Among the proposals is a 
low-income second mortgage tax credit 
that would encourage homeownership 
by lowering down payment and closing 
costs and by reducing housing costs in 
general.227
Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
 Tax increment financing (TIF) is 
a mechanism by which local government 
provides homeownership opportunities. 
TIF allows local governments to finance 
improvements, in infrastructure for 
example, in an effort to attract business 
redevelopment in a target area.228  TIF 
relies on property value increases 
and property tax revenue to pay for 
community revitalization that could 
include redeveloping or rehabilitating 
deteriorated areas of  a city, facilitating 
the construction of  low-to-moderate 
income housing, promoting economic 




Some potential buyers who 
have adequate income to pay the house 
note and costs are still not creditworthy 
under traditional lending criteria.230 
Though helpful, programs designed 
to clean buyers’ credit histories are not 
designed to monitor buyers’ future 
credit habits.  A three-part program that 
allows the purchaser to buy the home 
during the pending credit “cleanup” will 
likely yield better results.  Under this 
option, the buyer would qualify for the 
program based on income and evidence 
of  financial stability.  Those with less 
than stellar credit ratings will have to 
participate in a credit counseling and 
cleaning program during the first year 
of  homeownership as a condition of  the 
mortgage subsidy or other assistance. 
Finally, the buyer will agree to a wage 
garnishment plan that hedges against the 
risk posed by the buyer’s limited credit 
worthiness.
It may also be possible to divert 
attention from the traditional house to 
a less expensive form of  housing like 
the modular housing that was popular 
in places like Levittown during the post 
war era.231  Other forms of  construction 
could also be made available, as well as 
smaller cottages and bungalows that 
support lower construction and sales 
prices.
Standard financing programs 
need to address the cost of  constructing 
homes and its effect on affordability.232 
In markets where housing prices fall 
below the average, demand tends to be 
very high.233 These markets consist of  
the working poor who do not qualify for 
public housing but do not make enough 
money to purchase a home.  While 
no person should be pressured into 
homeownership, the opportunity could 
be made available for those Americans 
who desire to be homeowners.  Often, 
construction costs limit the accessibility 
of  this market in several ways.  Contractors 
who build in the affordable market 
already realize limited profit margins 
that discourage entrepreneurial interest. 
They are not equipped to reduce the 
sales prices of  homes to meet the needs 
of  this forgotten market.234  The working 
poor generally do pay for housing and its 
amenities in the form of  rent and utility 
payments, but they often do not qualify 
for homeownership opportunities at 
rates comparable to rent.  
Foreclosure
Access to credit does not always 
portend success as a homeowner.  Some 
will lose their home to foreclosure. 
There are three sources of  risk that 
commonly lead to mortgage payment 
terminations:235 interest-rate related 
refinancing, default, and moving.236  For 
various reasons, higher risk loans are 
more likely to be affected by mortgage 
payment factors.  Market conditions 
may reduce the homebuyer’s ability 
to maintain mortgage payments.  For 
example, a slow market may affect 
the owner’s ability to resell the home 
and move unless the seller is willing to 
accept a loss.  Clearly, selling at a loss 
undermines the home purchase as a tool 
for building wealth.237  On the other 
hand, high risk homeowners in a fast 
market are commonly impacted by the 
rising costs, including increased property 
taxes, associated with the house, but 
such costs can be offset by the sale of  
the property at its enhanced value.  Here, 
the homebuyer is forced from her home 
as a “victim” of  a gentrified community. 
While such displacement does not 
necessarily mean financial detriment to 
the homeowner, it could significantly 
affect the maintenance and availability 
of  affordable housing.238  Foreclosure 
then looms as a potential threat to the 
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affordable homebuyer.  
Addressing the Roots of  Barriers to 
Homeownership Comprehensively
Capital and access to capital 
significantly impact a family’s ability 
to purchase a home.  As short term 
remedies, down payment assistance, 
mortgage buy downs, and other subsidies 
are very helpful but should be employed 
as part of  a long-term plan.  Education 
is internationally recognized as the single 
most powerful tool against poverty,239 
yet illiteracy in America is believed to be 
at least 20 %.240  Since the United States 
provides access to public education, it 
seems infeasible that so many Americans 
are uneducated or undereducated.242 
Studies show that when poor people are 
relocated from depressed communities 
to more mainstream communities, they 
tend to develop and maintain a new 
culture supportive of  upward mobility 
and education.243  Thus, concentrated 
communities of  poor people limit 
homeownership, and any potential 
solution should address racial, cultural, 
and economic diversity as part of  its 
design.
Conclusion
There is substantial 
reason to maintain a strong policy 
of  homeownership in America. 
Homeownership is the primary means 
of  developing wealth for most American 
families.  When whole groups of  people, 
defined often by their race, are denied 
access to this source of  wealth, it sustains 
an economic division that retards 
national growth and development.  As 
the American population is increasingly 
dominated by this group of  have-nots, 
the impact of  poverty on the United 
States and world economy is clear.
For over six decades, the United 
States has promoted a policy favoring 
safe, decent, and sanitary housing for its 
citizens.  For much of  that time, however, 
homeownership was reserved for 
Whites, while significant barriers existed 
for African Americans who wanted to 
own their own homes.  These barriers 
often closed the door to homeownership 
altogether for African Americans.  In 
other cases, the cost was so high as to 
have a deleterious impact on wealth, 
even for those African Americans who 
owned homes.  During the last decade, 
the policy has shifted to encourage 
homeownership, particularly for African 
Americans.  Regardless of  whether this 
shift occurred because the nation finally 
recognized that African Americans 
were being denied an important vehicle 
to prosperity, because of  a desire for 
racial equality, or because of  investor 
greed, the shift did produce an increase 
in African American homeownership. 
At any rate, recognition of  the goal of  
homeownership is meaningless without 
an assault on the remaining barriers to 
reaching that goal.  If  the goal is to be 
achieved, solutions must be aggressively 
pursued.  
The current world economic 
state has multiplied the challenges 
America faces.  Many of  the last 
decade’s financial practices have failed 
in catastrophic ways, and recovery is 
expected to be very slow.  Nevertheless, 
the role of  the mortgage market and 
of  the sub-prime loan in this calamity 
is infinitely small, so the American 
policy of  homeownership should not 
be reversed.  We should ensure that all 
Americans will share in the economic 
recovery and that the history of  disparity 
will be reversed.  An important part 
of  that recovery is the revival of  the 
housing market and the development 
of  strategies making housing more 
affordable.  Our efforts will be maximized 
if  we pursue a comprehensive program 
that meets short-term needs but also 
addresses long-term cures. T h e 
government must employ meaningful 
regulation to help identify the extent 
of  the continuing CDS liability.  Every 
buyer, holder, broker or seller of  a CDS 
should be given a limited period of  time 
to report its existence and its potential 
liability.  Companies or individuals 
who fail to self  report within the time 
period should be subjected to specified 
penalties.  The fledgling private lending 
marketplace should be supplemented 
with direct government mortgages, 
and the government should work with 
the private marketplace to ensure that 
lending practices are sound.  Mortgage 
lending programs should be developed 
that permit higher risk borrowers to 
buy non–traditional, and affordable, 
homes under more traditional financing 
structures.  Public and private policies 
must be in place to maintain reasonable 
and realistic property valuations. 
Programs that include features like 
wage garnishment or mortgage escrow 
agreements to help ensure loan repayment 
should be considered. The costs of  
affordable housing can be reduced in 
various ways, one of  which is through 
waivers of  income generating municipal 
and regulatory fees.  Also, historically 
un- and underserved communities can 
be targeted for capital improvements, 
particularly in infrastructure.  Lower 
cost building product alternatives, such 
as prefabricated or modular homes, can 
be used.  Land banks and/or land trusts 
can also reduce the cost of  housing.  The 
sources of  low-cost loans (investments), 
such as pension funds, should be 
identified.  Mixed-use and mixed-income 
residential developments should be 
encouraged, programs that provide down 
payment assistance should be continued, 
and predatory lending should be reduced 
while shoring up fair sub-prime products. 
Finally, homeownership illiteracy should 
be reduced via, for example, continued 
education components as part of  loan 
requirements or community-based 
campaigns to inform target populations 
of  the various programs available. In the 
long term, we must bridge the income 
gap between Asian Americans, Anglo 
Americans, African Americans, and 
Latinos, especially in those situations 
where the gap can only be explained 
by race.  We must reverse the trend of  
school drop outs and public education 
failure toward a trend of  achievement 
and productivity.  Finally, we must enact 
inclusive zoning laws and eliminate the 
myth of  the inherently substandard 
African American residential 
community.
The impact of  a wealthier 
nation will be felt by all Americans.  The 
fact that government policies denied 
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